

50X1-HUM

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DATE OF II

SUPPLEMENT REPORT

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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION FOR THE RESEARCH
USE OF TRAINED INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS

1. Walter Ulbricht stated that the Allied airlift has caused astonishment to the Soviets who are presently scanning the press and radio experts on public opinion, especially in Britain, and are particularly anxious to know whether the parliamentary discussions indicate dissatisfaction with the exorbitant cost of supplying Berlin. 50X1-HUM
2. The Soviets believed that the Western Powers would have to give up Berlin, being unable to feed the population. They still think the Allies will have to discontinue the airlift because of its cost and impracticability.
3. According to Ulbricht, it was the Soviet intention after obtaining sole possession of Berlin to renew claims to participate in control of the Ruhr. If these claims had been rejected, they would have proclaimed an independent eastern Germany. A further step would have been agitation in France to the effect that Britain and America were precipitating France towards another war. 50X1-HUM
4. [redacted] although the Soviet plan anticipated a peaceful occupation of Berlin, the Soviets will still resist by force any Allied measures or efforts to sent convoys to Berlin.

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